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Circuit Judges. 
 













PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Cornelius Riley appeals his conviction and sentence for distributing heroin. We 
will affirm the District Court’s judgment. We write for the parties, who are familiar with 
the record. 
I1 
Riley first argues that a witness’s supposed misidentification of him during trial 
ultimately led to a violation of Riley’s Fifth Amendment right to due process. At trial, 
police detective Greg Simpler testified about how he conducted a controlled purchase of 
heroin from Riley. When asked to identify Riley to the jury, Simpler stated, “He is sitting 
back there in the - - at the defense table. It looks like he’s wearing maybe a gray jacket 
maybe.” S. App. 42. Later in his testimony, the government’s attorney asked the District 
Court to declare for the record that Simpler had accurately identified Riley as the 
perpetrator. Instead of granting the government’s request, the District Court paused the 
testimony to hold a sidebar conference with counsel. 
During the conference, the District Court stated that it would not declare that 
Simpler had accurately identified Riley. The District Court said that it heard Simpler 
identify Riley as “the guy in the gray jacket,” S. App. 79, but noted that “[Riley]’s not 
wearing a gray jacket.” S. App. 80. Rather, Riley’s counsel was wearing a gray jacket, 
thus suggesting that Simpler might have identified Riley’s counsel as the perpetrator. 
Wisely exercising caution, the District Court decided that he was “not going to say the 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 





record reflects identification because I don’t think it does.” S. App. 80. The conference 
concluded, and the government’s attorney returned to questioning Simpler. Simpler then 
made a more precise identification of Riley, which the District Court accepted. 
In a post-trial ruling, the District Court changed course from its conclusion at the 
sidebar conference. The District Court explained, “I was not then sure whether Detective 
Simpler had or had not correctly identified [Riley],” but after “reviewing the exact 
testimony, it is clear that Detective Simpler was expressing some hesitation in how to 
describe what [Riley] was wearing.” App. 11a. The District Court continued, “Defense 
counsel was wearing a gray suit jacket. [Riley] was wearing a long-sleeved gray upper 
garment that I think was better described as a gray shirt than a gray jacket.” App. 11a. 
Thus, the District Court found that Simpler had correctly identified Riley before the 
sidebar conference. 
On appeal, Riley claims that Simpler initially misidentified Riley’s counsel as the 
perpetrator. He argues that the District Court’s subsequent decision to conduct a sidebar 
conference with counsel—leaving Riley alone at the table in front of Simpler’s gaze—
violated Riley’s Fifth Amendment guarantee to due process. According to Riley, the 
District Court’s action was “unnecessarily suggestive” because it gave Simpler a strong 
clue as to who he should identify as the perpetrator: the only person remaining seated at 
the defense table during the sidebar conference. Appellant’s Br. 31–32.  
As Riley acknowledges, he did not raise his objection to the sidebar conference 
until after trial, so we will review his due-process argument under the plain-error 





Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under the plain-error standard, a defendant must show that (1) an 
error occurred, (2) the error is “clear or obvious,” and (3) the error affected the 
defendant’s substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If a 
defendant satisfies these three requirements, we may exercise our discretion to reverse 
“only if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). 
 “A due process violation can result when an identification procedure is so 
suggestive that it undermines the reliability of the resulting identification.” United States 
v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2003). But we do not need to discuss Riley’s 
argument in depth because its key factual premise is lacking: Simpler did not misidentify 
Riley. In his post-trial ruling, the District Court found that Simpler had correctly 
identified Riley before the sidebar conference began. If Simpler had already identified 
Riley before the sidebar conference, as the District Court found, then the sidebar 
conference was not an unduly suggestive action that revealed to Simpler who he should 
identify as the perpetrator. Accordingly, there was no error.2  
II 
Riley next argues that the District Court violated the Sixth Amendment at 
sentencing by using a judicially found fact to increase Riley’s punishment when the fact 
 
2 Riley’s additional argument, that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest that rendered 
him ineffective because Simpler misidentified trial counsel as the perpetrator, also fails. 
Given the District Court’s finding that Simpler did not misidentify trial counsel as the 





should have been decided by a jury. Riley’s presentence investigation report (“PSR”) 
assigned an offense level of 30 for Riley’s conduct and gave him a criminal history 
category of IV, leading to a Sentencing Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. The 
probation office arrived at an offense level of 30 by using the results from a laboratory 
report indicating that some of the heroin found on Riley contained a fentanyl analogue. 
Riley argues that if the heroin did not contain a fentanyl analogue, then he would have 
received a Sentencing Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months. At sentencing, the District 
Court adopted the facts in the PSR and sentenced Riley to 100 months’ imprisonment. 
Riley asks us to extend the Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000), and United States v. Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), to cover any 
finding of fact that increases a defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range. He cites 
Apprendi and Alleyne for the proposition that factual determinations increasing the 
statutory maximum or minimum sentence must be made by a jury with proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. We review questions of law, such as Riley’s Sixth Amendment 
challenge, de novo. United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 452 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Our precedent forecloses Riley’s argument. In United States v. Smith, two 
defendants argued “that the District Court violated their Sixth Amendment rights by 
enhancing their Guidelines range on the basis of judge-found facts.” 751 F.3d 107, 117 
(3d Cir. 2014). “They contend[ed] that a jury, not a sentencing judge, must find any facts 
that increase a defendant’s sentence, even if, as in this case, the sentence implicated 
neither a mandatory minimum nor a statutory maximum.” Id. We held that Apprendi and 





district court may, consistent with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, engage in additional 
factfinding, using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, to select an appropriate 
sentence up to the statutory maximum based on application of the Guidelines.” Id.  
Riley’s conviction for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) yielded a 
minimum of five years’ imprisonment and a maximum penalty of forty years’ 
imprisonment. Our precedent permitted the District Court “to find facts relevant in 
selecting a sentence within th[is] prescribed statutory range” of five to forty years. Smith, 
751 F.3d at 117. The District Court’s factfinding replaced the baseline range of 77 to 96 
months with a range of 135 to 168 months. Both ranges are well within the statutory 
minimum and maximum.  
In addition to Apprendi and Alleyne, Riley claims that Peugh v. United States, 569 
U.S. 530 (2013), shows that the District Court violated the Sixth Amendment. In Peugh, 
the Supreme Court held that retroactively applying a more punitive Sentencing 
Guidelines range violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 544. The Court rejected the 
government’s argument that because the Sentencing Guidelines were advisory, their 
application lacked “adequate legal force to constitute an ex post facto violation.” Id. at 
548. The Court concluded that the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines meant 
little because “the range is intended to, and usually does, exert controlling influence on 
the sentence that the court will impose.” Id. at 545. Thus, application of a more punitive, 
retroactive Sentencing Guidelines range created a “‘significant risk’ of a higher sentence” 





Riley contends that “Peugh . . . reflect[s] the practical reality that sentencing 
guidelines are the prescribed range for sentencing just as much as minimum and 
maximum penalties.” Appellant’s Br. 23. Thus, “a fact which increases those ranges 
implicates due process protections.” Appellant’s Br. 23. But the Supreme Court rejected 
Riley’s argument in Peugh, noting that “the Sixth Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause 
inquiries are analytically distinct.” Peugh, 569 U.S. at 549–50. The Court explained, 
“Our Sixth Amendment cases have focused on when a given finding of fact is required to 
make a defendant legally eligible for a more severe penalty.” Id. at 550 (emphasis added). 
It continued, “Our ex post facto cases, in contrast, have focused on whether a change in 
law creates a ‘significant risk’ of a higher sentence.” Id. (second emphasis added) 
(quoting Garner, 529 U.S. at 256). Peugh does not help Riley’s case. 
* * * 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
